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INTRODUCTION:  Agro-industry - adding value to
agricultural commodities through processing before
they reach consumers - can play a key role in
agricultural development, especially if it is located in
rural areas.  In developing countries, agro-
industrialization is increasingly driven by globalization
, as manifested by foreign direct investment and trade
(Reardon and Barrett, 2000) - Mozambique is not an
exception..  Some of the characteristics of this process,
especially much more stringent standards for quality
and food safety, may work to exclude many small
farmers.  Whether this happens, or whether the
smallholder sector instead benefits widely from the
process, depends on the type of agro-industrial
investment taking place, and on the ability of
government and the broader "development
community" to assist these farmers to overcome the
organizational and technical barriers to their beneficial
participation.
Rural agro-industrial development has a very high
potential to help reducing rural poverty levels (Jaffee
and Morton, 1995; Dorward et al. 1998; Delgado,
1999).  The effects of particular agro-industries in a
given region, however, can vary depending on how
closely related they are to the rural poor, and, more
specifically, the set of factors that condition that
relationship, ranging from crop specific characteristics
to the economic and political environment.  Research
efforts towards a better understanding of those
relationships and the potential direct and indirect
impacts on rural poverty to inform policy decisions
are, therefore, very relevant.
This  flash deals with the issue of alternative
organizational forms in the interaction between agro-
industrial investments and the smallholder
agricultural sector in the food/fiber supply chain in
rural areas of Mozambique, and makes a preliminary
analysis on  links to poverty reduction, and the role of
policy in strengthening those effects.  This issue is
increasingly important, particularly for policy makers,
private sector and NGOs engaged in promoting rural
agro-industry in rural areas where poverty is more
accentuated.  
It draws on a reconnaissance study undertaken in
Mozambique in 2001
1.  
TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN
MOZAMBIQUE: Since the signature of the peace
accord in 1992 and the subsequent first democratic
elections in the country in 1994, there has been a
significant inflow of capital to support investments in
Mozambique.  There are some general and sub-sector
specific patterns.  First, the value of agro-industrial
investments represented, on average, almost 60% of
all investments in rural based projects in the period
1985-mid 2001.  Second, the total value invested in
agro-industry increased about 5 times from the period
1985-1990 to 1991-1996, from $33.4 million to over
$161 million.  Then it more than doubled from that
period to 1997-2001.  Third, over the entire period,
the focus of investment has moved from cotton and
tobacco (1985-1990) to a more balanced
diversification of investments in sectors like maize,
cotton, and cashew in the first half of the 1990’s.
More recently, since the late 1990s (1997-2001),
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there’s been significant investments in the sugar
sector, and some in tea as well.  Finally, there has been
a recent emergence of investments by several tobacco
companies in contract farming and processing
operations in the center/north of the country,
accompanied by a large increase in production.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGRO-INDUSTRY
AND SMALLHOLDERS: Current  agro-industrial
investments in the country demonstrate various
degrees of connectedness with rural households.
Those forms were summarized in this study in three
different types: Buying from independent producers
(IP); contract farming (CF), and plantation agriculture
(PA).  Predominant sub-sectors identified in each type
of arrangement were: IP (cashew, maize and the
mango sub-sector); CF (cotton, and tobacco growing
areas); and PA (sugar, tea, coconut, and citrus sub-
sectors). 
Between 1985 and mid-2001, about 45% of the total
value invested went to agro-industries dealing with IP,
32% for PA schemes and 23% for CF schemes.  For
the same period, on average investments by agro-
industries were$3.8 million under IP arrangements,
$6.2 million under CF, and $8.8 million under PA.
Investments in processing projects are predominantly
geographically located as follows: Maize (Maputo,
Nampula and Sofala), Sugar (Maputo and Sofala),
Cotton (Nampula, Zambezia, and Cabo Delgado),
Cashew (Nampula, Gaza/Inhambane and Maputo), and
Tea (Zambezia).          
AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS: Transaction costs economics,
applied to the maize, cashew, cotton and sugar sub-
sectors, was found to be helpful in predicting and
explaining the predominance of particular
organizational forms for these crops.  This approach
was also used to anticipate problems and strengths that
may be associated with alternative organizational
forms for the crops, and in identifying policy
interventions to promote them in a sustainable way. 
Theoretically Feasible, Observed and Suggested
Arrangements.  Table 1 synthesizes the theoretically
feasible, the observed and the suggested institutional
arrangements for selected sub-sectors in Mozambique.
This section summarizes the analysis for those sub-
sectors.   MADER/MSU Research Report #51E,
presents a detailed sub-sector specific analysis based
on a full set of transaction cost factors.
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Legend: IP=Processing with independent smallholder
producers; CF=Processing with contract farming;
PA=Processing with plantation agriculture.
Maize Sub-sector .  This is a key staple crop in the
country.  It is widely produced by rural households
and consumed in both rural and urban areas.
Production is predominantly by independent
smallholder farmers using very simple production
technology.  It is essentially a labor using technology,
with no significant economies of scale and without
widespread use of chemical inputs that can, however,
be increasingly used without the complex
management typically required on high value crops.
These production characteristics do not call for strong
vertical coordination and drive the sub-sector towards
independent production by smallholder farmers (IP).
Furthermore, the fact that processors have to compete
with many other buyers for a crop that can be traded
domestically or exported without prior processing,
increases dramatically the risk of default in contract
farming (CF) schemes.  Also, alternative forms of
processing - local hammer mills and home hand
pounding - create a highly dispersed domestic market
for final sale, which also makes CF highly
problematical due to credit default.   Contract farming
schemes are further disfavored because of problems
of contract enforcement due to a weak legal system in
rural areas, increased costs of coordination especially
for the monitoring of credit recovery and the deliveryPage 3
of extension assistance due to poor communications.
This is all aggravated by low literacy among farmers
that makes extension delivery for the dissemination of
improved technologies particularly costly.   In reality,
we observe the predominance of spot marketing
arrangements, though some investors are increasingly
suggesting CF as a feasible alternative to overcome
current problems.  While appearing to deal with some
issues, CF arrangements for this crop have a number of
adverse factors. 
Cashew Sub-sector .  A key insight from this analysis
is the critical importance to observed organizational
forms (entirely IP) of the ability to export the raw
cashew nut.  This ability is driven by two factors.
First, the very high value/weight ratio of the raw nuts
means that transport costs have less impact on the final
price received.  Second, the close proximity of India
further reduces transport costs, and the high installed
processing capacity and very low wage rates in that
country create incentives to pay more competitive
prices for the raw nut, especially early in
Mozambique’s harvest season when nuts from India
have not yet reached the processing plants.  Ethnic ties
between Mozambican traders and Indian buyers may
also decrease the transaction costs of this trade.  The
result is that processors must compete with many
potential local buyers for the raw nut, which
substantially increases the risk to them of promoting
production through contract farming arrangements.
This analysis is especially pertinent in light of the on-
going controversy surrounding the GOM policy of
charging excise taxes on the export of raw nuts.  In
fact, Parliament was unsuccessfully pressured to ban
raw nut exports. While such a step would seem to
address a key factor we identify here  as  impeding  the
emergence of  contract  farming   arrangements, it does
not follow that such arrangements would automatically
emerge if raw nut exports were banned.
Cotton Sub-sector .  This crop is generally grown in
areas where cotton processing investments are
installed.  The dependence on quality raw materials for
processing that highly depend on the use of chemical
inputs in a country that has high degree of market
failure in both input and credit markets creates the
need for some vertical coordination.  Full vertical
integration is not attractive because of the nature of the
crop characterized by high labor intensity in
production that significantly increases the supervision
costs in a plantation context, and the lack of economies
of scale in production.  Dispersed production is
possible due to the relatively high value-weight ratio
which reduces the impact of transport costs.  The need
for processing before final sale results in a limited
number of buyers that makes CF feasible.  The
organizational form that is predominantly observed is
effectively contract farming.  Some IP cases are also
present.  Although not strongly, some investors
suggest IP and PA arrangements, but the analysis
shows that without significant structural changes,
neither is likely to be a feasible solution.
Sugar Sub-sector.  This sub-sector requires high
investment in agricultural equipment, especially
irrigation, and use of large amounts of land in areas
with abundant water resources and rail facilities.  This
makes dispersed production difficult.  Moreover,
needed economies of scale in production to assure
scale compatibility with the processing stage, and the
low value/weight ratio that makes transportation costs
high, strongly favor vertical integration through
plantation agriculture arrangements.  The principal
observed form in Mozambique is indeed plantation
agriculture in the central and southern parts of the
country.  Historically, that has been the predominant
arrangement.  Some isolated cases of arrangements
with independent medium to large scale private
farmers were identified in the south.  Also, a ‘pilot
project’ for a CF scheme, funded by the South
African Government was launched in fields adjacent
to a sugar company in the southern province of
Maputo.  That was a coordinated effort between the
sugar company, the Mozambican Government
through the FFHA (Fundo de Fomento da Hidraulica
Agricola) and a local farmer Association.  The results
were encouraging indicating that, under certain
circumstances, CF schemes in this sub-sector are
potentially beneficial for all participants.
Alternative Arrangements.  No institutional
arrangement is without problems, and most investors
are constantly searching for ways to minimize
problems and take better advantage of opportunities,
in pursuit of increased profits.  The analysis presented
in Table 2 indicates that, while some of the problems
that are identified with the existing primary
arrangement may be eliminated with the alternative,
many other problems are likely to emerge and the
arrangements may or may not be desired on a poverty
reduction standpoint.  For each of the relevant crops,
the analysis identifies the problems reported byPage 4
investors and those from the farmers’ perspective
under the current arrangements.  Then, it examines the
likely difficulties facing alternative arrangements
under current conditions, the desirability of these
arrangements from a poverty reduction viewpoint, and
the prospects for success for the arrangement.  Finally
some key actions needed by government and private
sectors for the success of those alternatives are
discussed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY REDUCTION:
Under ideal conditions - full set of efficient markets,
including contingency markets, a well developed
physical and communications infrastructure, highly
educated populace and effective property rights
enforcement - spot markets will be the best and most
desirable organizational form.  The reality, however, is
that many of those conditions are not present in many
countries, even among the more developed ones.  In
SSA, that is no exception and Mozambique is just a
particular example.  Therefore, the presence of factors
that lead to high transaction costs in the relationship
between firms and farmers, give rise to alternative
institutional arrangements for managing transactions.
Such arrangements include vertical coordination
mechanisms that include a wide range of contract
farming approaches, and fully vertically integrated
plantation agriculture arrangements.  
The final judgment about the impact of sub-sector
specific arrangements on rural poverty of a given
region is an empirical question.  The study draws some
preliminary implications for poverty reduction.  
First, rural agro-industry can have direct and indirect
effects on poverty.  Direct effects come from wage
employment of the rural poor in processing facilities,
and from increased earnings to smallholders, who
supply raw material to the processing firm.  Indirect
effects can be substantial, and come primarily from
wage earners and smallholders re-spending their
earnings in the rural economy.  Much of this re-
spending will be on items produced in the local non-
farm economy, fueling its growth and increasing its
contribution to poverty reduction.  
Second, for either direct or indirect effects to be felt
and sustained, the activities must be profitable for both
the firm involved and also for rural residents.  
Third, the relation between poverty alleviation and the
institutional arrangements governing the relationship
between farmers and agro-industrial firms is not
linear and is likely to be commodity specific.
However, two key facts can be referred to within the
current context.  On the one hand, due largely to
information problems and to the failure of input and
credit markets, spot markets are frequently unable to
support high value crops in Mozambique.  If
smallholders are confined to low value crops,
escaping poverty will be very difficult.  On the other
hand, plantation agriculture generates only one direct
effect on poverty - wages - and tends to use capital
intensive technologies.  It will therefore almost
always generate less poverty reduction than will
reasonably successful CF schemes.  
Fourth, one challenge for policy makers is, therefore,
to find ways to make contract-based relationships
successful in both efficiency and equity grounds, i.e.,
financially attractive to firms while profitable for a
reasonable number of small farmers.
Finally, the characteristics of agro-industrialization
with globalization, particularly more stringent quality
and food safety standards, may make it difficult for
small farmers and small agro-industrial firms to
participate directly in the income growth that this
process can unleash.  The extent to which smaller
farms and firms can participate directly, and the
extent to which indirect effects are robust enough to
generate substantial poverty reduction on their own,
depends on many factors specific to the country and
commodity in which the investment is taking place.
SUMMARY OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS: We
draw some important implications for policy.  First,
many of the policies that will foster more direct
participation of small farmers in the  agro-
industrialization process - and thus more poverty
reduction - are steps that government should be
supporting from any developmental perspective:
improved roads and market information, improved
rural education, removing legal barriers to the
formation and development of producer associations,
development in coordination with the private sector of
workable grades and standards, and research on
technology development and diffusion, especially
improved seed varieties.  Page 5
Second, beyond these general policy interventions,
government needs to be sensitive to the details of
proposed investment projects and practical about how
to influence the type and location of investment to
maximize poverty reduction effects.  Whenever
possible, favor labor intensive as opposed to capital
intensive technologies, favor rural over urban locations
for the processing plants, and favor crops which can be
produced by the smallholder sector.
A good example in Mozambique is cashew processing,
where labor intensive technologies located in
production areas will have a greater impact on poverty
reduction than will the more capital intensive
technology located in urban areas.  
Sugar cane is predominantly produced under PA in
most of the world, due to specific characteristics of the
crop.  Yet contract farming schemes involving large
numbers of small farmers have been successful
complements to estate production in countries like
Kenya and Swaziland. Where feasible, government
should consider strategic actions to facilitate
smallholder access to irrigable land near sugar
processing plants, and should also consider financing
needed extension assistance to these farmers.  If done
in collaboration with sugar companies, such actions
would create win-win situations for companies and
farmers.  
Tea is another crop which, while most often produced
in plantations, also has a track record of successful
smallholder production under contract farming
arrangements.  In Mozambique, some of the value of
investment in tea has occurred under contract farming
arrangements.  Whenever possible, these arrangements
should continue to be favored over plantation
investments.  
Maize is entirely organized under Independent
Producer arrangements, and is unlikely to support
contract farming in the short- and medium-terms.
Improved grades and standards, if developed in
consultation with private investors, would be a key
contribution facilitating continued investment and
greater value added.
Cotton is produced almost entirely under contract
farming arrangements between large companies and
small farmers and has been very successful in
stimulating rural income growth and poverty
reduction.  Currently it faces serious problems in
terms of the quality of assistance offered by
companies.  Government policy in this crop should
focus on achieving a better balance between
competition and coordination, in order to better
safeguard the interests of farmers.  Facilitation of the
empowerment of farmer associations to reduce their
dependency from cotton companies and increase their
negotiating power to allow for increased direct
benefits should be one key pillar in this effort.
The challenge is in balancing the costs and benefits of
alternative policies and investments on efficiency and
equity grounds, finding the right kind of incentives,
and monitoring the effectiveness of the mechanisms
expected to affect rural poverty.  It would be very
helpful to government, in the process of evaluating
alternative investment proposals, if a simple method
for predicting the investment’s effects on poverty
reduction could be developed. 
FURTHER RESEARCH: Further research should
be centered around a more in-depth and combined
analysis between efficiency and equity of alternative
forms, and considerations about the spill-over effects
to effectively deal with the poverty reduction issue,
and inform the government to address policy options.
The process has to include three steps.  First, the
selection of specific sub-sectors and regions.  Second,
the development of a better understanding of the
economics of alternative institutional arrangements in
those sub-sectors and regions.  Lastly, the use of
regional impact analysis at the village level to: a)
measure the direct and indirect income effects that
result from alternative arrangements in selected sites
dominated by particular sub-sectors; and b) identify
and simulate alternative policy interventions, aimed
at strengthening firm-smallholder relationships, to
assess the likely direct and indirect effects on poverty.
Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, that
research should, therefore, be able to answer in more
precise terms three sets of questions in the context of
selected sub-sectors and selected geographic areas: 
1. What institutional arrangements between agro-
industrial firms and rural smallholder producers may
provide both efficient and equitable means of
overcoming high transaction costs?Page 6
2. What conditions are necessary for those
institutional arrangements to operate efficiently while
promoting a socially desirable distribution of income?,
and 
3. What is the role of the government in helping those
institutions - organizational forms - to succeed in
achieving sustainable growth with equity? 
The answers to this questions may help to address
more effectively the practical details of policy making,
including the design of incentive schemes to be
provided by the Government to influence investors
relationship with smallholder farmers.  This research
has to be capable of:
1.  Feeding an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of the
Government’s choices when providing incentives to
investors; and
2.  Facilitating the development of analytical methods
to evaluate an investment’s potential poverty
alleviation impacts including models capable of
capturing the likely multiplier effects.
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Table 2.  Reported Problems with Current and Alternative Choices and Key Private and Public Sector Actions
Current Arrangement  Suggested Alternative Arrangements
 Arrangement
(Sub-Sector)



























the grain at home or in
local hammer mills,
creating highly dispersed
domestic market for final
sale.  This makes CF
highly problematical due
to credit default.
+  Price uncertainty
+  Inconsistent quality








+  High dispersion of






the market and lack of
reliable storage
facilities farmers find
it difficult to balance
between food security





+ Returns to farmers may
be lower than the
opportunity cost of labor
+ Default due to many
potential  buyers
+ Problems of contract
enforcement due to weak
legal system
+ Low economies of scale






A company successful in emphasizing quality and paying a premium for that
quality could potentially make a CF scheme work.  Improved public G&S
would help.  Quality protein maize (QPM) may improve prospects for
success by supporting higher price, but there will be informational problems
at the consumer and possibly processor levels, requiring effective







nuts gives rise to many
potential buyers that the
local processors have to
compete with.  This rends
CF schemes difficult to
implement because of the
high risk of default.  Also,
current firms may not
have a comparative
advantage in the intensive
management needed for
successful CF scheme.
+  Price competition
with exporters;
+  Inconsistent quality;
+ Lack of  raw
materials/low
processing capacity use;
+  Lack of cash flow;
+  High dispersion of
sources;
+  Missing input/factor
markets.





+ Lack of negotiating
power and price
uncertainty makes it






+ Returns to farmers may
be lower than the
opportunity cost of labor;
+ Default due to price
competition with exporters
given the weak legal
system to ensure contract
enforcement;
+ High cost of extension
and input delivery if
farmers are not organized
in groups;
+ Cost of procurement of
new varieties and inputs;
+ Current firms may not
have a comparative







+ For an effective CF scheme in cashew, firms need to be committed to an
intensive management approach;
+ Firms need to be effectively engaged in promoting new plantings and
control PMD;
+ Adopt decentralized smaller scale technologies that are scalable to farm
level production capacity;
+ Continuing GOM support to research in PMD control and new varieties
and extension; and 






+ Problems with access to
land with security of tenure
close to processing unit;
+ Lack of excess farm
labor for selected tasks;
+ High direct labor and
supervision costs;
+ High risks associated
with direct crop
production.
No N/A N/ACurrent Arrangement  Suggested Alternative Arrangements
 Arrangement
(Sub-Sector)



























Credit and input market
failure in combination
with input needs of the
crop create need for CF or
PA arrangement.  Labor
intensity and lack of
economies of scale in
production preclude PA,
while need for processing
prior to final sale
(resulting in limited
number of buyers) makes
CF feasible.
+ Default due to price
competition among
cotton companies
+ Default due to weak
legal system
+ Lack of farmer





+ High dependence on
the cotton companies











+ Difficult expansion to
area cultivated close to
processing unit
+ High direct labor costs,
due to labor intensive
nature of production
+ High labor supervision
costs
+ High risks associated









+ High marketing costs















PA advantageous as way





+ Difficult expansion of
area cultivated close to
the fixed investments in
irrigation
+ High capital costs in
expanding production
areas
+ High costs in
production supervision








direct  impact on rural







+ High specificity in
production techniques that
require high costs in
extension
+ High costs with
investments in irrigation
Yes Possible + Success of CF in this sub-sector only possible if there is an effective
partnership between GOM and the company in sharing the costs associated
with increased smallholder participation.  The company needs to make basic
investment in irrigation (incentives to the company  given by GOM if
needed).  It is in the companies interest to reduce extension costs and the
GOM may participate with the provision of those services and in helping
organizing farmers for an effective and well rewarded participation.